The Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act: A Path to Ending a 70-Year Deadlock

By: Alan Hunchan Jeong

The Korean Peninsula is one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world, with an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty marking the fallible pause of the 1950–1953 Korean War. While the 1953 Armistice Agreement halted active hostilities, it did not officially end the war. As a result, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea remain technically at war. Most notably, South Korea requires every male citizen—many of whom can be easily encountered on U.S. college campuses – to serve in the military, highlighting the seriousness and urgency of geopolitical tensions in a divided nation amid the unresolved war. Decades of hostilities and diplomatic setbacks have left the region in a prolonged state of limbo.

To promote a peaceful resolution regarding the hostile conditions on the Korean Peninsula, Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) has repeatedly introduced the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act since the 117th Congress. Congressman Sherman emphasizes that the ongoing conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not in the best interests of the United States or its citizens with familial ties in North and South Korea, stressing the urgent need for serious diplomatic efforts to establish peace between the two Koreas. [1] The legislation promotes dialogue and a binding peace agreement between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. It calls for reassessing U.S. policies that currently impose strict limits on engagement with North Korea.

The bill proposes several key initiatives aimed at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, it seeks to advance diplomatic efforts among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States to formally end the Korean War and to establish U.S.-North Korea liaison offices. [2] The legislation requires the U.S. Department of State to submit a report to Congress outlining “a clear roadmap for achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula;” this report would include diplomatic strategies and recommendations for advancing engagement with both North Korea and South Korea to reach a “binding peace agreement constituting a formal and final end to the state of war between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.” [3] By providing a framework for dialogue and permanent peace, the bill seeks to reinvigorate diplomatic efforts for engagement with North Korea that have largely stalled since the breakdown of the 2019 U.S.-North Korea talks in Hanoi, Vietnam. The failed attempt of the U.S.-North Korea Hanoi Summit reinforces the need for a detailed framework on how to approach North Korea. The backdrop for improving relations still exists, however, as the U.S.-North Korea joint statement signed in Singapore in 2018 included an agreement to “establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.” [4] A binding peace agreement and the respective liaison offices would not only enhance U.S.-North Korea relations by facilitating engagement that serves U.S. national interests but also advance greater humanitarian causes.

A second provision of the bill calls for a review of the travel restrictions currently in place for U.S. nationals wishing to visit North Korea. [5] Since 2017, the U.S. government has imposed stringent travel bans preventing Americans from entering North Korea due to security concerns, particularly following the tragic case of Otto Warmbier, a U.S. college student who died after being detained by North Korean authorities. [6] While these restrictions were enacted for citizen’s safety, the bill recognizes the “compelling humanitarian considerations” to reunite U.S. citizens with family members left in North Korea, as around 100,000 Americans have relatives there – at least to allow them to attend a funeral, burial, or commemoration of their loved ones. [7]

Despite its grand initiatives, the bill faces significant challenges. Opponents have argued that the legislation is premature and poses serious security risks to South Korea, as it could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, the weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the dissolution of the United Nations Command, and the easing of sanctions on North Korea without ensuring its denuclearization. [8] To address critics’ concerns that the bill’s enactment could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, the updated version of the legislation introduced in the 118th Congress includes Section 6, Rule of Construction: “Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect the status of United States Armed Forces stationed in South Korea or any other foreign country.” [9] Accordingly, Seoul’s stances on engagement with North Korea and a peace agreement are determining factors. While past South Korean administrations – particularly under Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in – actively pursued engagement with North Korea through several summit meetings with its leaders, the current conservative administration has taken a hawkish stance on North Korea. [10]

However, it is important to consider that engagement does not necessarily mean appeasement; rather, it provides an invaluable opportunity to manage tensions, prevent conflict, and gradually build trust – an essential strategy for resolving geopolitical conflicts worldwide in the name of national interest and realpolitik. A notable example is the U.S.-China rapprochement during the Sino-Soviet split of the Cold War, which advanced U.S. national interests and contributed to the eventual decline of the Soviet Union. Policymakers must carefully navigate these diplomatic dynamics to ensure that any peace initiative aligns with the greater security interests, as losing security means losing everything.

As the bill continues to progress through Congress – it has garnered bipartisan support with 52 cosponsors by the end of the 118th Congress – its success will depend on bipartisan cooperation, strategic diplomatic efforts, and public advocacy. [11] The legislation reflects a growing recognition that the status quo – where the Korean War remains unresolved – may no longer be a sustainable long-term approach. If passed, the Act could mark a grand step toward achieving peace not only on the Korean Peninsula but also across the greater Indo-Pacific, highlighting that diplomacy remains a feasible path even in the face of long-standing geopolitical challenges. While challenges remain, the bill underscores the importance of shifting U.S. policy from one of confrontation to one of pragmatic diplomacy and engagement.

Notes:

1. “Congressman Brad Sherman Leads Colleagues in Re-Introducing the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congressman Brad Sherman, March 1, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://sherman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-brad-sherman-leads-colleagues-in-re-introducing-the-peace-on.

2. “Text - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congress.gov, March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/text.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Department of State, “United States Passports Invalid for Travel To, In, or through the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” Federal Register, August 8, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/08/2024-17519/united-states-passports-invalid-for-travel-to-in-or-through-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.

7. “Text - H.R.1369.”

8. Hyeon-seok Gang, “[bareondae] ‘hanbando pyeonghwabeobane’un sigisangjo [[Speakers’ Corner] The ‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act’ Is Premature],” Koreatimes.com, February 12, 2025, accessed February 15, 2025, http://www.koreatimes.com/article/20250212/1551631.

9. “Text - H.R.1369.”

10. Gagan Hitkari, “Why South Korea Needs to Reassess Its Hardline Stance against Pyongyang,” South China Morning Post, November 10, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3285856/why-south-korea-needs-reassess-its-hardline-stance-against-pyongyang.

11. “Cosponsors - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Congress.gov, March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/cosponsors.

Bibliography:

Congress.gov. “Cosponsors - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/cosponsors.

Congress.gov. “Text - H.R.1369 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 3, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1369/text.

Congressman Brad Sherman. “Congressman Brad Sherman Leads Colleagues in Re-Introducing the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” March 1, 2023, accessed February 15, 2025. https://sherman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-brad-sherman-leads-colleagues-in-re-introducing-the-peace-on.

Department of State. “United States Passports Invalid for Travel To, In, or through the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” Federal Register, August 8, 2024, accessed February 15, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/08/2024-17519/united-states-passports-invalid-for-travel-to-in-or-through-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.

Gang, Hyeon-seok. “[bareondae] ‘hanbando pyeonghwabeobane’un sigisangjo [[Speakers’ Corner] The ‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act’ Is Premature],” Koreatimes.com, February 12, 2025, accessed February 15, 2025. http://www.koreatimes.com/article/20250212/1551631.